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Parties' candidates are chosen by different nomination rules. Recent empirical evidence shows 
that these rules influence the attributes of the nominees; for instance, open primaries in the U.S. 
choose more extreme candidates than closed primaries. Despite this evidence, the literature does not 
provide an explanation of why appealing to a more moderate electorate -as during open primaries- 
results in more extreme candidates. I build a model that shows that open primaries elect \predictable 
extremists", while, for instance, party leaders would chose \moderate mavericks". I obtain these results 
through a model that puts together 3 pieces of partisan politics: affiliation decisions, nomination rules, 
and an observed endogenous valence, which (together with party membership) signals the candidates' 
ideologies. Moreover, I investigate the welfare implications of three methods: nomination by the party 
leader, by closed primaries, and by open primaries. I show the conditions under which nomination by 
party leaders leads to higher social welfare than nomination by open primaries. Furthermore, I show 
that higher screening by parties, leads to more ideologically uncertain candidates. In sum, I argue that 
party affiliation decisions, and endogenous valence play a large role in understanding the effects of 
nomination rules on the political equilibria. 
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As electoral institutions that shape the outcome of elections, partisan nomination rules systemat-
ically influence candidates’ attributes. Although there is a large body of empirical evidence that
examines the relationship between candidates and nomination rules, there are few theoretical pa-
pers that address this relationship. In this paper I explain how different nomination rules result in
different types of candidates by endogenizing the “median voter” in primary elections. Moreover,
political parties are central to the explanation in that they signal candidates’ ideology and provide
the pool of potential candidates. Thus, I show that open primaries’ candidates (where all citizens
vote) are expected to be more extremist and less popular (lower valence) than closed primaries’
(where only party members vote). Likewise, when the party leader handpicks the candidates, he
selects a more moderate and more popular candidate.
Political scientists have long argued for empirical regularities in the U.S. primary systems that
select legislative and presidential candidates (Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), Gerber and Morton
(1998), Alvarez et al. (1995), Ansolabehere et al. (2007)). Recent evidence shows that (1) open pri-
maries select more extreme candidates than closed ones (King 1998, Kanthak and Morton (2001)),
and highlights that (2) primaries induce competition between co-partisans that may be harmful
in the general election (Agranov (2009)). Whether there is a nomination method that is superior
to any other selection mechanism, remains an open question. However, it is striking that in the
U.S. less than a fourth of the states select their candidates through open primaries; and around
the globe, only a dozen countries have ever had a primary to select presidential candidates.
In general, any approach to studying the systematic influence of intraparty politics on the equi-
librium requires dealing with at least three different, but intertwined, aspects: voters’ preferences,
the nomination rule itself, and party affiliations. That is why, despite the evidence that partisan
nomination methods play a role, few models study their effects on the political equilibria thoroughly
(Jackson, Mathevet and Mattes (2007)). Furthermore, there is no formal model that explains both
why open primaries’ candidates are more extreme on average, and why holding primaries can harm
the electoral chances in the general election. Incorporating those three aspects, I investigate the
effect of intraparty institutional arrangements on the selection of candidates in a bipartisan democ-
racy. In particular, I study the influence of affiliation and nomination strategies on the candidates’
ideology and valence.
Valence is a broad term that has been coined by Stokes (1963) to refer to those issues that
cannot be found on the liberal-conservative continuum (Downs (1957)). More generally, valence is
modeled as an observable characteristic that affects all voters equally, independent of their ideology.
For example, campaigning skills fit the modeling assumptions in this paper, since they influence
the citizens’ vote without necessarily increasing the voters’ utility, ceteris paribus. The novelty of
my approach is that instead of suggesting valence is exogenous (Groseclose (2001)) or is a partisan
investment decision (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009)), I argue that all citizens are endowed
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with a level of valence. Therefore any likable personality traits that may result in electoral returns,
such as oratorical abilities, good looks, charisma, and other observable skills fit the model.
In particular I study three games which only differ in their nomination rules. Thus, the institu-
tional comparative statics is focused on the effect of three stylized nomination rules: open primaries
(where all citizens vote), closed primaries (where only affiliated citizens vote), and “handpicking”
(by the party leader). Each rule defines who is the decisive citizen in choosing the nominee; I call
that citizen the “nominator”. In open primaries, the nominator is the general median voter; in
closed ones, it is the median party member. Regardless of the rule, the nominator is constrained
to choose a candidate from the pool of party members, which is an equilibrium outcome of the cit-
izens’ affiliation decisions. The decisive citizen is the median voter when the median voter theorem
holds: while in the case of closed primaries the theorem holds under very general conditions, the
same is not true in open primaries. Nevertheless, I prove that the outcome of all open primaries
elections are “median voter like” in the sense that the nominated candidate always coincides with
the median voter’s perferred choice.
Each individual, described by his private ideology and public valence, optimally decides whether
to join a party. The affiliation cost increases as the ideological distance to the party’s platform
increases; thus, party membership is partly informative of an individual’s ideology. Furthermore, it
leads to informative party labels, a` la Snyder and Ting (2002): a candidate from the liberal party is
more likely to be more liberal than conservative. Conversely, I assume that the consumption benefit
of being a party member increases as the citizen’s valence increases, grounded on the intuition that
higher valence individuals can extract more rents by joining a party1.
As a result, there is some degree of substitutability between ideology and valence: citizens
that are ideologically far from the party’s platform can affiliate if their valence is high enough.
On the other hand, those who are close to the platform can affiliate regardless of their valence.
Therefore, despite the fact that ideology and valence are independently distributed, voters update
their beliefs on each the candidate’s ideology by looking at their valence and memberships: high
valence candidates are less predictable (higher variance). That is, valence operates as a mean
preserving transformation around each party’s platform. Thus, I build a spatial model with valence
and probabilistic voting where policy motivated politicians enjoy ego rents for winning, but cannot
commit to any policy.
I organize the results of the model according to the literature in which they fit. Regarding
valence, I show that it is a strategic substitute for platforms’ moderation. That is, nomination
rules solve the trade off between valence and certainty, such that larger platform differentiation
leads to more popular candidates in equilibrium. Intuitively, when parties are ideologically close to
each other, their median primary voters are indifferent when choosing a candidate based on policy.
Thus, since voters are risk averse, they select a low valence, low variance candidate.
1As I explain in the main body of the paper, assuming otherwise results in high valence “alienated” citizens that,
although they are very close to one party’s platform, they do not affiliate to it.
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Regarding the nomination rules, I show that party leaders choose more popular (higher valence)
candidates than voters in primaries, and voters in closed primaries nominate higher valence candi-
dates than in open ones. More generally, as party primaries cater to a more moderate electorate,
the nominated candidate is lower valence. As before, when the median primary voter is more
centrist, he cares less about his candidate winning because he is close to the other party’s median
voter; hence, he chooses a less popular candidate, who is also less “expensive” in terms of uncer-
tainty. Similarly, when parties are sufficiently moderate and leaders anticipate more democratic
nomination arrangements, party leaders choose a more extremist platform; hence, they countervail
the nominators’ incentives to lower valence, and they reduce their own compromise in policy. In
short, open primaries’ candidates are (low valence) “predictable extremists”; on the contrary, party
leaders’ candidates are (high valence) “moderate mavericks”. Consequently, I show that primaries
are not a self-enforceable institution: when parties can choose a nomination method, and politicians
are exclusively office-motivated, they prefer that the party leader handpick the candidate. This
new result provides a novel explanation of why so few countries nominate their candidates using
primaries. Furthermore, I show that more democratic methods might be less efficient under specific
circumstances wherein the median voter might prefer that the leaders pick the nominees.
Regarding the size of parties, although I do not search for an optimal level of screening, I show
that, contrary to popular wisdom, more cohesive parties increases the equilibrium uncertainty of
the location of candidates. Because of the increasing costs, narrower parties choose higher valence
candidates at a lower marginal cost, which causes an overall increase of variance.
Although nomination methods are not central in the explanation of the economic and political
performance of countries, they could contribute to understanding some facts. For instance, recent
moves toward open primaries in the U.S. (see Serra 2010) could help in our understanding of the
phenomenon of party polarization; also, nomination by party leaders in Latin American countries
may add to their policy instability. Therefore, partisan nomination methods should not be only




Since Stokes’ introduction of valence issues, as opposed to strong unidimensional ideologies, the
term has been used to name all those issues that affect voters but cannot be found on the liberal-
conservative continuum (Downs 1957). More specifically, political economists have posited that
valence refers to an attribute or set of attributes, either of the party or of the candidate, that all
voters like equally (in general, without satiation point). For instance, it has been modeled as an
unobservable trait that implies commitment to the “correct” policy (Callander and Wilkie (2007),
Kartik and McAfee (2007)). Snyder and Ting (2002) and Agranov (2009) explore the ambiguity
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of politicians2, which might also be described in relationship to valence. Finally Groseclose (2001),
Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009), and others, model valence as a known characteristic of
parties or candidates.
Early work on valence issues has treated it exogenously, finding that candidates with a “valence
advantage” choose more centrist platforms (Groseclose (2001)). Similarly, when it is endogenized as
a partisan investment decision, the results resemble those of vertical differentiation: less ideological
differentiation, higher valence competition (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009)).
Parties
Political scientists have developed different models of parties that define their scope and limitations
(see Aldrich (1995) for an account on parties and their history in the U.S.). One way or another,
parties regulate the competition of their members in a way that limits the behavior of candidates,
and affects the political equilibria. However, only recently have intraparty constraints been formally
incorporated into the political economy literature. For instance, Hirano et al. (2009) shows how
candidates’ incentives to cater to certain factions during the primaries affect the post-electoral
allocation of resources. Snyder and Ting (2002) emphasize the informative role of party labels
as a result of citizens’ affiliation decisions. Crutzen et al. (2010), and Serra (2010) study under
what conditions it is optimal for a party to nominate candidates through primaries. Ashworth and
de Mesquita (2008) investigate the implications of partisan screening on the outcome of elections.
Primaries
Despite this growing trend, and although it has been long acknowledged that party membership
and primaries are strongly connected (Berdahl (1949)), few papers study them together. Meirowitz
(2005) tackles this issue, and models primaries as devices that allow candidates to learn voters’
preferences after observing their membership. The work of Jackson, Mathevet and Mattes (2007)
comes closest to the argument of this paper, and provides a model of endogenous parties that
specifically studies how the candidates’ ideologies depend on the nomination procedure. In partic-
ular, it finds that when candidates are nominated by vote (the equivalent to closed primaries in my
model), candidates are more moderate than those chosen by the party leader. On the other hand,
when they make an allowance for endogenous parties, they show that median outcomes hold in the
voting setup.
My work adds to this literature by providing a rationale for the evidence that indicates open
primaries choose more extreme candidates. Although open primaries cater to a more moderate
electorate, policy-motivated party leaders strategically choose more extreme platforms, closer to
their own preferred policy. Therefore, I not only show that open primaries’ candidates are more
2The literature on ambiguity is broader: Aragones and Neeman (2000) and references thereafter.
5
extreme on average, but also that their ideology is more predictable (lower variance). Conversely,
I call party leaders’ candidates moderate mavericks not only because they have more moderate
ideologies on average, but also because they have higher ideological variance.
2 The model
There is a continuum of citizens. Each citizen has a private ideology zi distributed uniformly in the
policy space [−k, k], and an observable valence qi, drawn from a uniform distribution with support
[0, q¯], independent of i’s ideology. There are also two exogenous political entrepreneurs with private
ideologies zx and zy in the policy space.
I study three stylized games, which only differ in the way parties nominate their candidates;
that is, they differ in their nomination rule r. Before explaining each rule, I introduce the general
timing:
• Political entrepreneurs announce platforms simultaneously.
• Citizens affiliate to party X, Y, or none.
• Nominees are chosen simultaneously, from the set of affiliated citizens, and according to the
nomination rule r.
• All citizens vote
The political entrepreneurs establish parties X and Y, and announce the political platforms
or manifestos taking into consideration the implications of the game form. These platforms are a
public declaration of “guidelines and principles” pinpointed in the policy space, that depend on r,
and are called xr and yr, respectively. Given those platforms citizens decide whether to affiliate to
a party, and which one. Then, depending on the nomination rule, each party chooses a candidate
from the pool of affiliated citizens. Each nominee is described by his (unobserved) ideology, his






Y ). Finally, the general election takes place, and
the winning candidate implements his own preferred policy.
The timing and the nominations rules are also explained by figure (1) below. The nomination
rule r can take three values depending on whether the nominee is handpicked by the party leader
(r = l), or by a majoritarian primary election, which can be a closed primary (r = c) or an open one
(r = o). In each party, for each type of nomination arrangement, there is one citizen who is decisive
in the nomination of the candidate. I call that citizen the “nominator”, and he is endogenous to
the nomination rule: while in the autocratic case the party leader handpicks the candidate, in the
democratic ones, the median voter in each primary chooses the candidate.
I abstract from turnout decisions and crossover affiliations: all party members vote in closed
primaries, and all citizens vote in open ones (and in the general election). Also, there are no
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Figure 1: Party formation and nomination stages
crossovers; no citizen that prefers to affiliate to party X will affiliate to party Y in order to change
the outcome of the other party’s primary election (sincere affiliation and voting).3 Therefore, the
nominator in a closed primary is the median party member. In an open primary, the nominator’s
ideology is 0, as it coincides with the general median voter. At last, when r = l the nominator’s
ideology is zx (the party leader’s).
Voters derive utility from their private activity and from the implemented policy. Regarding
their private activity, citizens can either become politicians or work in a firm. I define B(qi) as
the payoff of choosing a political career for a citizen with valence qi, and for simplicity, I fix his
opportunity cost (the market return to valence, or wage) to zero.4 Moreover, I assume that B(qi)
is strictly positive, increasing and convex in qi, which implies that valence is more rewarded in the
political arena, and at an increasing rate.
The cost of affiliation is the ideological distance from an individual’s preferred policy to the
party’s platform; it is the disutility of misrepresenting his ideology. Intuitively, for politicians it
3That is, I do not look at the strategic calculus of activism (Aldrich (1983))
4More generally, B(qi) could be defined as the spread between the market and the party’s return. Let the
gross return to valence be Priv(qi) in the private sector, and Pol(qi) in a political party. Then I define B(qi) ≡
Priv(qi)− Pol(qi) as the net return of valence in politics.
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is costly to make public statements they do not necessarily agree with, or to vote accordingly to
the party’s mandate instead of according to their own preference.5 For easier notation, I drop the
superscript r in until necessary. Therefore, the voters net return of joining party X with platform
x is
B(qi)− (zi − x)2. (1)
Similarly for party Y, and 0 if unaffiliated.
Citizens are risk averse, and have quadratic preferences on the implemented policy, which they
cannot observe in advance . However, voters update their beliefs on the distribution of candidates’
ideology, by looking at their affiliation and valence. Let the p ∈ {X,Y } stand for party X or Y;
thus, the expected utility from policy when party p wins is
ρi(z˜p; qp) = −(zi − E(z˜p|qp))2 − V (z˜p|qp) (2)
Let ap ∈ {aX , aY , a∅} stand for voter affiliation to party p, or none respectively. Putting
equations (1) and (2) together, I obtain voter i’s expected utility when candidate (z˜X ; qX) wins:
ui(ap, z˜X ; qX) =

B(qi)− (zi − x)2 + ρi(z˜X ; qX) if i is party X’s member
B(qi)− (zi − y)2 + ρi(z˜X ; qX) if i is party Y’s member
0 + ρi(z˜x; qX) if i remains unaffiliated
(3)
The political entrepreneurs also enjoy ego rents δ if their party wins; therefore, party X’s leader
utility is
ux(z˜x; qX) = δ + ρx(z˜X ; qX),
if candidate with qX wins the election.
Probabilistic voting. All voters have an exogenous bias α˜ for party Y’s candidate that parties
cannot fully anticipate, but whose distribution depends on the observed valence of the candidates.
Thus, i votes for party X if
ui(ap, z˜X ; qX)− ui(ap, z˜Y ; qY ) > α˜(qX , qY ). (4)
I assume that the bias α˜ is distributed uniformly with support [−α+ h(qX , qY ), α+ h(qX , qY )],
where h(qX , qY ) = ω(qY − qX). This approach resembles the additive bias model of probabilistic
voting (Banks and Duggan (2005)), with the exception that the distribution of the bias depends
on a choice variable. This modeling decision intends to emphasize the electoral role of valence:
citizens do not necessarily like valence per se, but as a campaigning skill that biases their decision
5Consistently with Snyder and Ting (2002) it could also be interpreted as the cost of interacting with members
whose average ideology is the party’s platform
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at the time of voting. For instance, if party X candidate is higher valence than Y’s, he is a better
campaigner; then the shock α˜ has a negative mean, which means that, in expectation, i votes for
party Y, only if qY gives him a higher expected policy payoff.
3 Results
In this section I study the consequences of different partisan institutional designs on the nominees;
but before getting into the details of each nomination rule, I go over the three common stages of
the game. For the rest of the paper, I study the symmetric game with zx = −zy < 0.
Electoral stage.
As mentioned in the previous section, i votes for party X if equation (4) holds. Thus, it follows
that the probability that he votes for party X is
Pr(i votes for X) = Pr(ρi(z˜X ; qX)− ρi(z˜Y ; qY ) > α˜(qX , qY )) ≡ P i.
Therefore, given the platforms x and y, and the candidates’ valences qX and qY , the probability








E(z˜y|qy)2 − E(z˜x|qx)2 + V (z˜Y |qY )− V (z˜X |qX) + ω(qX − qY )
2α
Nomination stage.
The nomination rule defines who is the decisive citizen in the nomination stage. In particular,
for the case of primary elections, throughout the paper the nominator is the median voter. That
is, I solve “as if” the median voter theorem holds; nonetheless, in the appendix I show why this
approach is appropriate: in closed primaries, the theorem holds under very broad assumptions, and
in open primaries, the preferred candidate of the median voter is always nominated.
Therefore, given the platforms xr and yr, let the nominator’s utility be un(·); then he chooses





p)) = Pxun(ap, z˜X ; q
r
x) + (1− Px)un(ap, z˜Y ; qry).
In the Appendix, I provide a discrete version of a game that begins at this stage. Solving that
case provides a more straightforward intuition of the results with only two valence levels qH , and
qL, which could also be interpreted as a two-candidate primary.
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Party formation stage.
This stage of the game involves two separate substages: first, the party leaders announce their
party platforms, and after observing them, citizens take their affiliation decisions. Either if citizens
affiliate to a party, or they stay working for a firm, the decision is irreversible. A direct implication
is that party members are potential candidates that can be chosen as nominees of their parties:
affiliated citizens are politicians indeed. 6 For simplicity I assume x < y.
Affiliations. For any observed pair of platforms, a citizen described by the pair (zi, qi) affiliates
to party X if
E(ui(ax, z˜p; q
r




p)) ≥ E(ui(a∅, z˜p; qrp)).
Thus, party X is fully described by its leader zx, its platform x
r, and its members
M(X) ≡ {i : −(zi − xr)2 ≥ −(zi − yr)2 and B(qi) ≥ (zi − xr)2} .
The conditional distribution of ideologies given valence and party affiliation can be easily cal-
culated as a result of the uniform distribution of ideologies. In particular, disregarding for now the
bounds of the support of ideologies, the first two central moments are
E(z˜i|qi, i ∈M(X)) = xr (5)
V (z˜i|qi, i ∈M(X)) = B(qi)
3
(6)
Thus, the expected ideology of any party X’s member is the party’s platform. Moreover, the
median party member in X = [zx, x
r,M(X)] is a citizen with ideology xr, the party’s platform.
Furthermore, a candidates’ ideological variance is increasing in his own valence. Therefore, when
voters observe a higher valence candidate, they also believe him to be farther from the party’s
platform (to either side).
Remark 1 When the cost of affiliation is increasing in the “ideological distance” to the party’s
platform, party labels are informative.
Remark 2 Higher valence candidate are ideologically riskier (less predictable).
Hence, the main trade off arises. Although parties would like to nominate extremely good
campaigners (high valence), their selection comes at the cost of a higher ideological uncertainty.
The trade off is solved during the nomination stage by the nominators as explained in detail below.
6I also disregard other fair concerns regarding politicians such as those treated in Mattozzi and Merlo (2008),
Diermeier et al. (2005), etc.
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Furthermore, notice that for any given valence, there is a continuum of citizens; thus the
probability of party member i being chosen as the candidate is negligible. Therefore, at the time
of deciding their affiliation, citizens do not take into account the probability of being the nominee.
Platforms. At the beginning of the party formation stage, given the nomination method r,
the political entrepreneurs announce their own party political platforms or manifestos, anticipating
its possible effects on the citizens’ affiliation decisions, the probability of winning, and the location
of the nominator. Thus, party X’s leader maximizes his expected utility:
max
xr
Px(δ + ρx(z˜X ; qX)) + (1− Px)ρx(z˜Y ; qY ) (7)
From now on, I focus on the symmetric equilibrium, and the case when x < 0 < y. Then, I only
show party X’s results unless stated otherwise, since party Y’s problem is conceptually the same.
Moreover, as indicated in the remark below, I assume what is necessary to avoid parties hitting the
bounds of the support, and parties’ overlap. Otherwise, parties could artificially make their brands
more informative (reduce variance) by being very extremist or centrist.
Remark 3 I restrict to (1) moderate values of zx and zy (neither close to 0 nor to |k|); (2) B(0)
and q¯ small enough; and (3) k large enough. Then, neither overlapping, nor extreme extremism
occurs.
In what follows I study each game in detail, and in the following section I compare the equilibria,
and I study the welfare implications.
3.1 Party leaders handpick the nominees: r = l
In this section, I look at the least democratic nomination method. The political entrepreneurs -or
party leaders- not only establish the parties, and choose the political platforms or manifests, but
they also handpick the nominees of their own parties. This autocratic case is worth studying as
it is widespread around the world; for presidential races, only around a dozen countries haver ever
had a primary to select their candidates (Mainwaring (1993), Carey and Polga-Hecimovich (2008)).
Nomination stage. Given the platforms xl and yl, the party leader with ideology zx, who is
policy and office motivated, chooses the nominee such that he maximizes his utility; he solves:
max
qX
Px(δ + ρx(z˜X ; qX)) + (1− Px)ρx(z˜Y ; qY ).
Let Πl(x
l) ≡ δ + ρx(z˜X ; qX)) − ρx(z˜Y ; qY ) be the party leaders’ winning payoff in terms of policy
and ego rents; and let V (z˜X ; q
l
X) ≡ Vx(ql). Then, from the F.O.C., the interior equilibrium of this
subgame is found by solving
w − V ′x(ql)
2α
Πl(x
l) = V ′x(q
l)Px > 0 (8)
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Figure 2: Equilibrium vs. probability of winning maximizing valence
Intuitively, a higher valence candidates is more likely to win, but when V ′x(ql) > 0, it comes at
the expense of a higher variance. The nominator dislikes variance as well, therefore he balances
the gain in probability with the loss in his policy payoff: that is, the expected net marginal gain of
increasing the valence (LHS) is equal to the expected marginal loss (RHS).
Lemma 1 Let B(qi) positive, increasing, and convex in qi. Then there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium valence in the nomination subgame, ql, which is implicitly defined by:
V ′(z˜X ; ql) ≡ V ′x(ql) = ω
δ + 4zxx
l
α+ δ + 4zxxl
(9)
From equation (6), the variance is positive, increasing, and convex if B(qi) is. This assures
the existence of an interior equilibrium, where the S.O.C. hold. Intuitively, B(0) > 0 leads to
non-empty parties, B′(qi) > 0 ensures the trade off between valence and closeness to the political
platform, and B′′(qi) > 0 ensures the existence of an interior equilibrium. These assumptions do not
only ensure the unique symmetric interior equilibrium, but also an interesting one. If the returns
to valence (and so the variance) were decreasing, we would have corner solution where all parties
go for the highest valence candidate. A similarly uninteresting equilibrium arises if the variance is
concave, since the net return to variance (ω − V ′(q)) would be increasing for all q. Therefore, the
convexity of V (q) permits that the probability of voting is maximized for a level of valence q∗ such
that V ′(q∗) = ω, which cannot be achieved by this (or any other) nomination method under this
setup (see figure (2)).
Party formation stage. I study a symmetric perfect bayesian equilibrium when xl < 0 < yl,
where the party leader chooses the party’s platform such that it maximizes his expected utility











The marginal cost for the leader of choosing a more moderate platform is the marginal loss
of choosing a policy further to his (RHS). On the other hand, the marginal benefit is the sum of
marginal increase in the probability, plus the marginal effect on the equilibrium variance ( ∂V
∂xl
< 0).
Intuitively, the party leader equates the probability gain of choosing a more centrist platform with
the policy loss at the margin, discounting the second order effect of a smaller valence. The following
lemma shows the symmetric equilibrium platforms.
Lemma 2 For k large enough, the political entrepreneurs choose to form parties X and Y with








= xl − zx (10)
Similarly for party Y.
The proof of the lemma can be found in the appendix. The large k ensures that the political
entrepreneur does not find optimal to run by himself instead of forming a party. Furthermore, since
xl < 0 and Πl(x
l) = δ+ 4zxx
l > 0, the party leader always choose to form a party with a moderate
platform, relative to his ideology: xl − zx > 0.
Intuitively, since I assume that every citizen’s ideology is private information and nobody can
credibly inform it, the expected ideology of any non-affiliated citizen is E(zi) = 0, and the expected
variance is the variance of the distribution, V (zi) =
k2
3 . However, when party leaders form a
party and announce a platform, independently of any credibility issue, as voters self-screen around
that platform, the announcement becomes the median ideology of the party. Therefore, the party
leader’s gain from establishing parties is caused by (1) signaling candidates’ ideologies, and by
(2) the possibility of choosing a higher valence nominee. On the other hand, there is a policy
compromise; once it is established that party leaders will form parties, it follows that they will do
it closer to the median voter, so they increase the likelihood of winning. 7
Remark 4 For k large, any unaffiliated candidates’ ideology is expected to be E(zi) = 0, and his
variance V (zi) =
k2
3 . Thus, the party leader finds optimal to form a party.
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3.2 Closed primaries: r = c
In this section, I study the game with a primary election where only party members can vote.
Exploring this case is specially interesting since this is one of the few institutions in democratic
life where qualified voting has endured without having a well studied rationale for it. A salient
7Notice that I do not formally let the party leaders, who are not uncertain about their own ideology, to run as
candidates from outside the party. However, I look under which conditions they would not find that profitable at all;
that is, when parties are “self enforceable”
8Both, the remark and its intuition, resemble Snyder and Ting (2002)’s “information rationale” for political parties,
but in two dimensions: ideology and valence
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difference with the previous case is that the nominator’s ideology is now the party’s platform x,
and he does not have ego rents.
Nomination stage. As in the previous case, the nominator chooses the candidate by maximiz-
ing his own expected utility. Therefore we obtain the equilibrium valence, which can be described
as a corollary of lemma (1).
Corollary 1 Under assumptions in lemma (1), when the nominee is chosen by a majoritarian






Party formation stage. Similarly, when the party leader anticipates a closed primary he








= xc − zx (12)
3.3 Open primaries: r = o
It has been argued that as open primaries appeal to a more moderate electorate, candidates se-
lected through this institution are expected to be more moderate as well (Gerber and Morton
(1998)). However, there are two strategic effects that are disregarded by that argument: as party
leaders anticipate the nomination rule, they can accommodate the platform to countervail the open
primaries’ effect. Also, as a result, the set of potential candidates (affiliated members) changes.
Nomination stage. I have assumed an uniform distribution of ideologies, symmetric around
zero; hence the expected median voter’s ideology is zero. Therefore, also as a corollary of lemma
(1), I state the optimal valence in this game.
Corollary 2 Under assumptions in lemma (1), when the nominee is chosen by a majoritarian
open primary election, his symmetric equilibrium valence is defined by
V ′x(q
0) = 0 (13)
Party formation stage. When the party leader anticipates a candidate with the lowest





o) = xo − zx (14)
In the next section I compare the symmetric PBE of each game; that is, I compare the columns
in the table below.
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r=l r=c r=o
(xr, yr) xl,−xl xc,−xc xo,−xo
(qr, qr) ql, ql qc, qc qo, qo
4 Analysis
In this section I expand on the results of the previous section, I highlight the results on valence,
and I explore the systematic differences across institutions.
4.1 Direct implications
Valence
In contrast to previous research, as parties become less differentiated, the nominator chooses a
lower valence candidate - equations (9) and (11). Since platform moderation causes lower valence,
these two are regarded as strategic substitutes. This effect does not take place in open primaries,
where the nominator always chooses the lowest valence level possible since he is indifferent between
parties -see (13).
Previous results in this literature state that higher valence and moderation are complementary.
For instance, in Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009), valence resembles the results of “vertical
differentiation” from the industrial organization literature: if a voter is ideologically indifferent
between two parties, he would vote for the highest valence candidate with certainty. Moreover,
if platforms converge, the candidate with higher valence wins with probability 1. Hence, the less
differentiated the parties are, the higher incentives to invest in valence.
Since I introduce the national shocks α˜ (which is not an exclusive shock to valence), convergent
parties cannot win with probability one by choosing a higher valence candidate. Since valence is
costly, does not guarantee a victory, and parties care about the implemented policy (because parties
are described as a set of voters who naturally care about it), then they nominate higher valence
candidates to “compensate” for less centrist platforms.
Institutional design
In this section I show the main differences in the candidates expected attributes caused by the
use of different partisan institutions to select them. Broadly, the main prediction is that open
primaries’ candidates are predictable extremists, while candidates handpicked by party leaders are
moderate mavericks; with the closed primary being the intermediate case. That is, on average, the
location of a candidates chosen by open primaries is more extremist, and their ideological variance
is smaller -ceteris paribus- relative to closed primaries’ candidates. This result is stated formally
below.
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Proposition 1 (Institutional comparative statics) Let B(qi) be positive, increasing and con-
vex; let zx = −zy < 0; and let xr < 0 < yr. Then from the comparison of the symmetric equilibrium
across institutions we learn:
1. Monotonicity result: given any pair of platforms, more moderate nominators choose lower
valence candidates. Thus
ql > qc > qo.
2. Open primaries extremism: when party leaders anticipate an open primary election during
the nomination stage methods, they choose more extreme platforms. Thus
xo < min{xc, xl}.
3. Closed primaries extremism: let B(qi) = aq
2
i + b, and assume α > 2Πz(x
l); then
xc < xl.
And similarly for Y.
The monotonicity result states the main difference across nomination rules when platforms are
fixed: roughly, more democratic primaries produce less popular (lower valence) candidates. In order
to disentangle what causes the result, notice that, endogenously, the nominator in open primaries
is more moderate than the one in closed primaries, who himself is more moderate than the party
leader. (This last step is an equilibrium shown in equations (10), (12), and (14).) Then, as the
nominator becomes more centrist, his preferences for one party over the other become milder,
therefore he cares less about the outcome of the general election with regards to policy. Hence, the
nominator chooses a lower valence candidate whose expected location is still the party’s platform
but whose variance is lower.
That party leaders choose higher valence candidates than closed primaries still holds even if
the party leaders are not more extreme than the median party member. Intuitively, if the political
entrepreneurs have very large ego rents they will still choose a higher valence nominee; that is,
δ
4 > 4(x
c)2−xlzx. Although in equilibrium the party leader is more extreme than the median party
member, and the empirical literature partially confirms this hypothesis (Alesina and Rosenthal
(1995)9)
Regarding open primaries extremism, the party leaders’ choice of platform has no effect on the
nominators’ choice of valence, which is qo = 0; therefore this institutional design resonates with
a standard probabilistic voting with no valence, and serves as a benchmark case for the following
9They show that presidential candidates are on average more extreme than the median party member; assume
the elected president to be the leader of the party, then my result holds.
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analysis. Policy and office motivated party leaders select their compromise in policy up to the point
where they balance the expected loss in probability with the expected gain in utility; disregarding
any thought of valence.
Figure 3: Optimal platforms by nomination rule
In comparison to the previous case, when the leader anticipates a closed primary, he cannot
pull the platform so close to his ideal point because now it comes at the cost of a higher variance.
First, fix the platform: the closed primary’s nominator already chooses a higher valence candidate.
Second, let the platform become more extreme: this has two effects that push to an even higher
valence; the nominator is now more extreme, and the substitution effect increases (| ∂q∂x | is larger).
Then, although valence increases the probability of winning -ceteris paribus- it also increases vari-
ance in the party leaders’ payoff in case of winning, but also in the case of losing (see equation
(12)). Summing up, without considering the effect of valence, the party leader pulls the platform
as close as possible (as in open primaries), but when he anticipates an effect on valence and vari-
ance, he has to choose a more moderate platform. The same reasoning applies to explain xo < xl.
Furthermore, notice that the introduction of valence pushes the symmetric equilibrium to one with
less differentiation.
Remark 5 The equilibrium in standard probabilistic voting models with office and policy motivated
politicians is more moderate with the introduction of valence as purely campaigning skills.
Whether xc < xl depends on the party leaders’ relative payoff of winning. Intuitively, if the
gains of winning are really high, he would prioritize a more moderate platform (which comes only
at an individual policy cost), over a higher valence-higher variance candidate. In the proposition,
I look at the opposite case: α > Πz(x
l). When the party leader himself handpicks the nominee, he
is already solving the trade off with the pair (ql, xl) he likes the most. However, when the nominee
is chosen by voting in a closed primary, given a platform, the party leader expects a lower valence
candidate. Then when, he does not care a lot about winning (α > Πz(x
l)) the party leader will move
to a more extreme platform in order to increase valence. Moreover, the strategic substitution effect
is decreasing in Πz(x
l), thus the adjustment in valence is higher for low Πz(x
l); | ∂q∂x | is decreasing
in Πr(x
r′).
An alternative and also intuitive explanation is the following: when the noise in the economy is
large (α > Πz(x
l)), and the party leader does not control the choice of the nominee in the second
period (primaries), he does not find as profitable to invest in a moderate platform so he pulls it
to a point where he likes it better. A different approach is to think of the ex-ante moderation of
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the party: if the party leader is already moderate (low Πz(x
l)), not only he does not lose much by
reducing his compromise in policy, but also he compensates it by a larger adjustment of valence.
For a complete proof of the proposition, please refer to the appendix.
Welfare analysis
In this section I study whether the social welfare in the society, defined as the general median voter’s
utility, changes under the different institutional settings. Loosely, since the median voter chooses
the nominees for both parties in the case of open primaries, I investigate under what circumstances
he prefers a different nomination rule, where he delegates the choice on somebody else.
Intuitively, social welfare when the median voter is the nominator (Ωo) can be larger than when
the party leaders handpick the nominees (Ωl), only if the loss in variance is larger than the gain
in policy. Recall that when the political entrepreneurs anticipate an open primary, they choose a
more extreme platform. Therefore Ωo ≤ Ωl if and only if
u0(x
o, 0) = −(xo)2 ≤ −(xl)2 − Vx(ql) = u0(xl, ql) (15)
Lemma 3 Let B(qi) = aq
2
i + b, and α > Πl(x
l)2 + αΠl(x
l). Then, exists m¯ = m(α, δ, b;xo) such
that for all ωa > m¯, the following holds: Ω
o ≤ Ωl
A large ωa is a sufficient condition that indicates that the role of valence in voting is large relative
to its role in affiliation decisions. That is, despite campaigning skills do matter when citizens vote,
its role in extracting higher rents from the party -and as a substitute of ideological distance- is
rather limited. In such case, although the variance increases fast with valence, the substitution
effect increases even more rapidly; that means that as the party leader chooses a more centrist
platform, he will reduce the valence by much. Thus, under the nomination rule r = l, not only the
platforms are more centrist, but also the overall variance does not increase so much with respect
to the open case. Intuitively, decreasing a is similar to increase party’s screening (as for the same
valence, an affiliated citizen has to be closer to the platform); and I show in the extensions that
the equilibrium valence and variance increase with partisan screening. Regarding the remaining
assumptions, as in proposition (1), the one on B(qi) simplifies the analysis; and the assumption on
α is necessary, otherwise for low α’s, the welfare is always the highest under open primaries. The
proof of the lemma can be found in the appendix.
From the lemma above, it follows that there is also a m¯, such that for any ωa larger than it,
then Ωo ≤ Ωc. Under the same assumptions of the lemma above: m¯ < m¯, thus for ωa ∈ [m¯, m¯] the
median voter prefers closed primaries to open ones, although not necessarily prefers r = l to r = c.
In general, whether Ωl ≤ Ωc is ambiguous.
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Figure 4: Welfare analysis
4.2 Comparative statics
The institutional comparative statics have shown that nomination rules matter essentially through
two mechanisms. First, they change the location of the median voter, and, consequently, the set
of potential candidates. Second, as the nomination rules solve the trade off between valence and
variance differently, they also change the incentives of the party leader in the first stage of the game.
Furthermore, in general, the regular comparative statics exercises also have to take into account
the nomination methods.
Recall that the open primaries case serve as a the no valence benchmark, where the first stage
choices do not affect the choice of valence. Therefore, the static and dynamic effects are null.
Remark 6 (Open primaries) In open primaries, the optimal valence is always qo = 0, therefore,
as the party leaders’ ego rents or the systemic uncertainty α change, qo remains at the minimum.
On the other hand, due to the substitution effect between valence and platforms moderation
( ∂q∂x ≤ 0), the case of of closed primaries and handpicking turn out to be more interesting. During
the nomination stage, a decrease in α, or an increase in ω result in a higher valence qr, for r ∈ {c, l}.
Also, as δ increases, ql increases. The static effect (disregarding the effects on the following stages)
during the party formation stage, would be the same as before: higher δ, and lower α would push
platforms to the center. However, this compromise by the party leaders would indirectly reduce


























For the remainder of the section I study the effect of the systemic noise and ego rents on the
equilibrium valence and platforms, for each case; and let B(qi) = aq
2
i + b. Thus,
Lemma 4 (Systemic noise: r ∈ {l, c}) .
• Extreme parties: dqdα < 0. Let ωα be large. If Πr ≥ 2α, then as the systemic uncertainty α
increases, the party leaders choose more moderate platforms, and so the equilibrium valence
qr decreases.
• Moderate parties. If Πr ≤ 2α, then as the systemic uncertainty α increases, the party
leaders choose more extreme platforms. The effect on the equilibrium valence qr is ambiguous.
As mentioned above, the direct static effect of a larger α would be to decrease both valence,
and platforms (more extreme). However, in this game those two decisions may be taken by dif-
ferent players. The party leader’s response to increased uncertainty has to take into account the
“nominator’s” response to it, plus the indirect effect. At the nomination subgame, every nominator
decreases the valence as α goes up. In order to increase his overall utility, the party leader could
choose a less moderate platform to compensate the future reduction in valence, or he could do the
opposite and choose a more centrist platform (which increases the probability of winning). It turns
out that the more the nominator cares about winning ( for 2α ≤ Πr), the substitution effect be-
tween platforms and valence gets milder. Therefore, the party leader finds optimal to choose a more
moderate platform to compensate for the future reduction in valence. On the other hand, when
2α > Πr, the party leader chooses a more extreme platform, and the overall effect is ambiguous.
Regarding the effect of δ, I study each case separately.
Lemma 5 (Ego rents, r = l) .
• Extreme parties: dqdδ > 0.Let ωα be large. If 2Πl ≥ α, then as the party leaders’ ego rents
increase, they choose more extreme platforms, and so the equilibrium valence ql increases.
• Moderate parties. If 2Πl ≤ α, then as the party leaders’ ego rents increase, they choose
more moderate platforms. The effect on the equilibrium valence qr is ambiguous.
The intuition is straightforward. When the returns to winning the elections are high, increasing
them makes parties more eager to win. Since ex-ante all voters are equally affected by valence, and
the underlying noise (α) is low, the party would like to improve their electoral chances choosing a
higher valence candidate. Therefore, both the indirect effect (more extreme platform) and direct
effect, increase valence as ego rents increase.
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On the other hand, when there are closed primaries, and the party leaders’ ego rents go up,
they always increase their compromise in policy by choosing more moderate platforms. However,
they move the platforms up to a point where still the overall effect on valence is positive. That
is, when δ increases, the probability of winning is increased both by a higher valence and by more
moderate platforms.
Lemma 6 (Ego rents, r = c) When δ goes up, party leaders choose more moderate platforms,
and valence increases unambiguously.
4.3 Other implications
Democratization of nomination rules
In this section I briefly study why parties do not nominate their candidates by more democratic
methods more often. As mentioned above, the current bias against primaries in general, and open
primaries in particular is intriguing. While political scientists and world leaders advocate for clean
and popular elections as a necessary condition to choose democratic representatives 10, arguably
one of the most important and common institutions to all democracies such as political parties are
still halfway in the democratization path. 11
When political parties’ selection methods are not regulated exogenously, it is party leaders (or
the elite) who can choose to democratize their internal procedures. However, when the platforms
are fixed (i.e. during the nomination stage), party leaders would only delegate the decision to a
median primary voter if it does not make a difference: trivially, if voters do not care about valence
(ω = 0), or if there is no party differentiation (x = 0 = y). Otherwise, when the preferred party
leaders’ candidate is different to the preferred median voters’ candidate, the former would never
democratize the nomination rules.
This argument could lead to the conclusion that moderate parties have more open nomination
methods. However, this claim is true only if the party platforms are fixed. Otherwise, when party
leaders anticipate a more open nomination method, they choose a more extremist platform (see
Proposition (1) above). Instead of addressing the effect of platforms on the democratization of
nomination rules, in the following remark I highlight the effect of nomination methods on the
polarization of parties.
Remark 7 In the short run, when the platforms are fixed, more democratic nomination rules can be
observed if there is platforms convergence. However, in the long run, more democratic nomination
rules are observed in extremist parties.
10The two most widely quoted criteria from Dahl (1989) are (1) effective participation and (2) voting equality at
the decisive stage
11“Genuine democratic elections serve to resolve peacefully the competition for political power within a country
and thus are central to the maintenance of peace and stability.”, from the Declaration of Principles for International
Election Observation, endorsed by the UN and various organizations such as “The Carter Center”.
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Primaries harm the probability of winning
A related but different topic is whether holding primaries harms the likelihood of winning elections.
By the hypothesis of “divisive primaries”, candidates nominated through primaries have a smaller
probability of winning when they are more intense contests (see Agranov (2009) for references and
a theoretical explanation). 12
I do not account for the intensity of primaries, but I briefly address the issue of whether primaries
reduce the probability of winning. It is worth emphasizing that no nomination method studied here
maximizes the probability of winning (see figure (2)). Moreover, fix party Y’s choices to (y, q), then
party X’s probability of winning is highest when the party leader is the nominator, and lowest when
voting in open primary does.
In the same line, it is fair to ask what is the best nomination method for an opposition party,
when the incumbent’s attributes (valence and ideology) are perfectly known. It turns out that for
any observable pair (y, qy), party X maximizes the probability of winning when the party boss
hand-picks the candidate. These facts provide additional intuition for the observed scarcity of open
primaries in particular, and primaries in general, to nominate candidates. That is why, I pose,
primaries are rare and unstable events when they are not mandatory (Hirano et al 2009).
5 Extensions
In this section I modify some details of the original setup in order to answer new questions that
emerge from some features of the model. In particular, I study the effect of different affiliations costs
on the equilibrium. Then, I briefly address the robustness of my results to the perfect observability
of valence (instead of ideology).
5.1 Partisan screening
In order to study the sensitivity of the equilibrium valence to the affiliation costs I assume that the
platforms are fixed, with |zx| ≥ |x| and |zy| ≥ |y|, and I introduce partisan screening s into the net
returns to affiliation:
B(qi)− c(zi)s.
For any pair (i, qi), a larger s makes affiliation more costly. Therefore, for a given valence q, higher
screening costs leads to smaller uncertainty on the location of the candidate. On the contrary, lower
affiliation costs makes for a wider party ideologically (less cohesive), and the party label becomes
less informative. 13 In this setup, a more informative party label can lead the nominator to choose
12The empirical literature still struggles with this hypothesis since some studies find either no effect (Alvarez et al.
(1995), for the U.S.) or a positive effect (Carey and Polga-Hecimovich (2008) for Latin America).
13If we think parties as a “tent”, as it is commonly mentioned, lower screening costs enlarge that tent.
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Figure 5: Optimal valence for different screening levels vs benchmark s=1
higher valence candidates at the same cost, so his incentives change, and therefore the equilibrium
changes.
Lemma 7 Let qrP (s) be the equilibrium valence in party P, given the nomination rule r, and the
screening cost s. The optimal valence qrP (s) increases monotonically in s.
On the other hand, party leaders also accommodate the party’s platform to the affiliation
costs. In particular, more informative party labels (higher s) reduces the uncertainty of any given
candidate, which permits the leader to bring the platform closer to his preferred policy. For a
formal proof of this intuition, and the previous lemma, see the appendix.
A conjecture: The case of California
In June 2010, California has changed its nomination rule for candidates to the U.S. Congress by
moving toward more open primaries 14. As argued above, despite that the new nomination rule
in California does not fit any of my previously studied stylized rules, if platforms stay fixed in
the short time, opening up primaries should produce lower valence candidates than the previous
Californian candidates. Moreover, political scientists have stated that the change of rules could
also affect candidates’ entry (see Kanthak and Morton (2001) for a summary of this literature). In
particular, open primaries could lead to entry of more candidates, which within my model can be
14To a system where the top two candidates with more votes in the primaries are the ones that run in the general
election, independently of their party affiliation
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re-stated as lower screening costs, “wider” parties, and less informative labels. Consequently, lower
valence candidates will arise not only as a direct result of the open primaries but also because of
a lower s. Thus, assuming that still one candidate from each party makes it to the top two vote
getters, extrapolating the results of the model, and adding screening as explained, the following
prediction is in place.
Conjecture 1 In the short term, Californian candidates’ will be of more predictable, and lower
valence on average.
Intuitively, larger candidate entry, and the loosening of party ties dilutes the party brands.
Hence, voters select candidates whose ideology is easily predicted, instead of high-valence mavericks.
It is worth noting that in the medium and long run, as platforms can be changed, two effects take
place. As stated in the main body of the paper, the parties will become more extremist (|xo| > |xc|)
due to the change in the nomination rule and candidates’ entry. However, this platforms’ movement
also counterweights (partially or fully) the reduction in valence.lutes the party brands. Hence, voters
select candidates whose ideology is easily predicted, instead of high-valence mavericks. It is worth
noting that in the medium and long run, as platforms can be changed, two effects take place. As
stated in the main body of the paper, the parties will become more extremist (|xo| > |xc|) due to
the change in the nomination rule and candidates’ entry. However, this platforms’ movement also
counterweights (partially or fully) the reduction in valence.
Optimal screening
An interesting question naturally arises: what is the optimal level of screening? From the lemma
above, and q ∈ [0, q¯], with q¯ <∞, choosing an infinitely large screening cost would ensure that you
can choose the highest valence candidate at zero cost. Therefore, the main trade-off disappears. 15
5.2 Observed ideologies
Throughout the paper I have assumed that valence is common knowledge, while ideologies are
private (as in Snyder and Ting (2002). This is a sensible assumption, and it is consistent with
the remaining modeling choices. However, in order to show that the main result is robust to this
assumption, I provide a brief intuition on how the mechanisms in the model would change if the
ideology of citizens is observed.
Suppose that zi is observed, and that qi is private knowledge, and independent from the ideolo-
gies. The set of affiliated voters does not change, and the size and composition of parties is the same
as before. Moreover, among the affiliated citizens, the correlation between ideology and valence
still holds. Therefore, when voters observe the ideology and the affiliation of the candidates, they
15However, if s could only be chosen up to s¯, then the gain from a larger s may depend on whether the optimal q
is above or below q¯
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update their beliefs on the conditional density qi|zP . They would still be risk averse on ideologies,
but now there’s no incomplete information on that dimension.
Lemma 8 Assume B(q) as before. For α large enough, there is large enough ωa , such that the
candidates’ valence is decreasing in nominator’s ideology. That is, more moderate nominators
choose candidates whose valence is smaller, on average.
Intuitively, when ωa is large two effects are taking place. First, as ω increases, the value of
signaling a large valence increases, relative to choosing a more moderate policy; therefore, more
extreme nominators chose candidates whose preferred policy is closer to them, and therefore have
higher valence. Second, as a decreases, ideology becomes a stronger signal of valence; therefore as
the nominator is more extreme, he cares more about winning, thus he chooses to depart more from
the party’s platform, in order to signal a higher valence. A proof of the lemma can be found in the
appendix. Also, as with the main model, higher uncertainty leads the nominator to choose smaller
valence levels. In this case, that allows him to pick a candidate whose ideology is closer to him.
On the contrary, suppose lim ωa −→ 0. When valence does not play a role, the nominator only
have incentives to choose a moderate policy to increase the probability of winning. Thus, more
moderate nominators are willing to compromise to more moderate policies. When choosing a more
moderate policy also has the benefit of signaling a higher valence, depending on the strength of the
signal, more moderate nominators may decide to compromise more (when the signal is weak), or
less (when the signal is strong). Moreover, if α is too small, all nominators find more profitable to
choose more moderate policies.
At last, notice that if high valence party members scale up positions within the party more easily
than low valence ones, then both voters and party members could learn the candidates’ valence.
This is one more reason, why in the general setup it makes more sense to assume that valence and
not ideologies are observed.
5.3 Cross-over voting
In this section, I simultaneously tackle two caveats of my approach. First, not all primaries fit my
open-closed setup; and not all citizens vote in primaries as assumed. By making an allowance for
mixed types, between the two stylized electoral rules discussed in the paper, the median primary
voter’s location varies according to the institutional details.
Regarding the institutional design, it should be pointed that in the U.S. there are open and
closed primaries, but there are a few intermediate cases as well. Following McGhee (2010) classi-
fication, there are two more types of partisan primaries: semi-closed, and semi-open. Broadly, in
the former voters can declare their affiliation on election day. In the latter, they are not required
of an affiliation, but they choose in which primary they are voting; that is, they cannot participate
in both.
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Taking into account the mixed cases helps to get around the assumptions of full turnout and
sincere voting, which despite being demanding (specially in open primaries), they are useful to
capture the idea that more open primaries appeal to a more moderate electorate. The main
difference among these mixed types is the level of crossover voting and turnout. For instance,
right-leaned citizens may turn out to vote in the left party’s primaries, either to help nominating a
candidate they like better (“sincere crossover”) or to help nominating a candidate with less chances
(“strategic crossover”). Therefore, within our stylized characterization of primaries, the amount
and type of crossover affect the location of the median voter in a primary election.
The introduction of a flexible “intermediate” case allows to account for differences in turnout
and crossover voting in a simple way: changing the location and affiliation of the nominator. Let
mp be the ideology in any primary where the nominator is a member, and op when he is not. For
instance, assume that higher sincere crossover voting moves the median voter in the primary closer
to the general median voter, hence the nominator could either be a more moderate party member
than the median member (|mp| > |m′p|), or a more moderate non-member (|mp| > |op|). Similarly,
higher levels of “strategic” crossover would produce a change “as if” the median voter were more
extremist. Intuitively, higher sincere crossover voting leads to less popular, lower valence, more
certain candidates. Let δm be stand for party member’s ego rents when his party wins, then the
following lemma formalizes the intuition.
Lemma 9 For δm > 4x(ox−mx) any party member always chooses a more popular candidate than
a non-member.
A party member with ideology mx ≤ ox always chooses a more popular candidate than a non
member. When mx ≥ ox, for sufficiently high ego rents, and sufficiently centrist parties (x close
to 0), the statement also holds. Intuitively, when the nominator is a non-member with extreme
preferences he cares more about winning and so he will lean toward a more popular candidate than
a member, unless the party is too centrist and/or the ego-rents are too high.
In sum, I posit that when the institutional design favors strategic cross-over instead of sincere
cross-over, the nominator is more extreme, and therefore the nominees are higher valence. Whether
semi-closed or semi-open primaries incentivize voters to behave in one way or another, depends
on the details of the rule, which cannot be easily captured just by the taxonomic description of
primaries.
6 Conclusions
I presented a model where party membership and valence play an important role in understanding
how nomination rules influence the choice of candidates. In particular, I have shown a rationale
for a piece of unexplained empirical evidence: open primaries’ nominees are more extremist and
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more predictable than closed primaries’ nominees. Similarly, if party leaders were to handpick
the candidates, they choose moderate mavericks, that is, less predictable, lower valence, more
moderate candidates. Moreover, when the campaigning effect of valence is high relative to its effect
on membership, social welfare under open primaries is strictly smaller than under an autocratic
nomination method as handpicking by the party leader. That is, under those conditions, before
the game begins, the median voter in open primaries would rather delegate his choice to the party
leader.
These results also speak to other branches of the literature, and provide novel results. I have
shown that valence, as campaigning skills that only affect the chances of winning, decreases with
platform moderation. Moreover, I provide one more explanation for the increases polarization of
parties in the U.S. that is not supported by a change in preferences. That is, the current trend of
opening up primaries leads to higher party polarization. Also, it is not necessarily true that parties
with more democratic internal structures (such as more open primaries) are more moderate. All
the contrary, when platforms are flexible, open primaries lead to more extreme parties. Last, I
also studied the effect of screening costs on the equilibrium valence of candidates: increasing the
screening costs makes for tighter parties that leads to nominate higher valence candidates whose
ideology is less predictable.
To sum up, the main predictions from the model are that (1) candidates chosen by more demo-
cratic nomination rules are expected to be more extremist and more predictable; (2) candidates
chosen by less democratic methods are more moderate but they are less predictable (higher vari-
ance); (3) nomination rules have an effect on the overall economy, as contribute to the explanation of
party polarization, democratization, policy instability, and the popularity of candidates. Therefore,
as rules that shape not only shape electoral outcomes, nomination rules should also be examined
as systemic variables in any given country or state.
7 Appendix
7.1 Bounded probability
Lemma 10 Let q∗ ≡ argmaxPx, then for α ≥ ωq∗ − V (q∗) + V (0) the probability of winning is
bounded between 0 and 1.
Proof. The probability of winning for party X in the symmetric equilibrium can be written as
PX ≡ α+ ω(qx − qy) + V (qy)− V (qx)
2α
.
Consider q∗ ≡ argmaxPx; no voter will choose a candidate whose valence is larger than q∗. Since
the benefit of higher valence, ωq − V (q) is convex in q, for any probability of winning with q > q∗,
there is a lower valence candidate that leaves the same probability of winning at a lower individual
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cost (lower variance). Thus, we can focus on q ∈ [0, q∗]. For all values of (qx, qy) ∈ [0, q∗]2, the
probability above is bounded between 0 and 1 when the following conditions hold: First, let take
the biggest possible value of PX , that is, when X chooses q
∗, and Y, 0:
PX <
α+ ωq∗ − V (q∗) + V (0)
2α
< 1
And, the smallest, when the opposite is true:
PX >
α− ωq∗ + V (q∗)− V (0)
2α
> 0.
Both conditions boil down to
α ≥ ωq∗ − V (q∗) + V (0)
7.2 Median voter theorem
Closed primaries
Lemma 11 Let q∗ ≡ argmaxPx, then for α ≥ ωq∗ + V (q∗) the median voter theorem holds
I need to proof that the expected utility of voter i with ideology zi ≤ 0 (for X primaries) - EUi(qx, qy)
- is concave in qx, in the compact set [0, q
∗] for all qy in the same set. If the EUi(qx, qy), is concave,
then it is single peaked. Proof. Let q¯ ≡ λq′ + (1− λ)q′′; then EUi(qx, qy) is strictly concave in qx
if for all (q′, q′′) ∈ [0, q∗]2, and for all λ ∈ [0, 1], the following holds:
EUi(q¯, qy) > λEUi(q
′, qy) + (1− λ)EUi(q′′, qy) (16)
Let the LHS be
α+ ω(q¯ − qy) + V (qy)− V (q¯)
2α
(4zix+ V (qy)− V (q¯))− (zi + x)2 − V (qy),
and in the RHS, we can write
λEUi(q
′, qy) ≡ λ[α+ ω(q
′ − qy) + V (qy)− V (q′)
2α
(4zix+ V (qy)− V (q′))− (zi + x)2 − V (qy)],
and
(1−λ)EUi(q′′, qy) ≡ (1−λ)α+ ω(q
′′ − qy) + V (qy)− V (q′′)
2α
(4zix+V (qy)−V (q′′))−(zi+x)2−V (qy)
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Thus, adding up the last two lines we get:
α+ ω(q¯ − qy) + V (qy)− λV (q′)− (1− λ)V (q′′)
2α
[4zix+V (qy)]−λV (q′)P (q′, qy)−(1−λ)V (q′′)P (q′′, qy)
We can re-write the equation (16) as
[4zix+ V (qy)][λV (q
′) + (1− λ)V (q′′)− V (q¯)] > V (q¯)P (q¯, qy)− λV (q′)P (q′, qy)− (1− λ)V (q′′)P (q′′, qy)
Since V (q) is convex in q, then V (q¯) < λV (q′)+(1−λ)V (q′′), so the left hand side is always positive
for x < 0 and zi < 0. Thus, if the function
V (q)P (q, qy) = V (q)
α+ ω(q − qy) + V (qy)− V (q)
2α
is convex in q, then the RHS is always negative. Its second derivative is
∂2V (q)P (q, qy)
∂q2
= V ′′(q)
α+ ω(q − qy) + V (qy)− 2V (q)
2α
+ 2V ′(q)
ω − V ′(q)
2α
.
Since V (q) is positive and convex, and ω − V ′(q) ≥ 0, a sufficient condition for ∂2V (q)P (q,qy)
∂q2
≥ 0 is
α ≥ ωq∗ + V (q∗).
Notice that the minimum condition for α+ ω(q − qy) + V (qy)− V (q) > 0 is
α > V (q∗)
if ωq∗ − 2V (q∗) > −2V (0), otherwise the sufficient and necessary condition is
α ≥ ωq∗ − V (q∗) + 2V (0).
However, to avoid making more assumptions on V (q) we just impose an additional constraint on
the distribution of α˜.
Open primaries
The median voter theorem does not necessarily hold in open primaries because the voters doing
crossover (i.e. that prefer Y but vote in X primaries) may be indifferent between voting for a low
valence candidate with a low probability of winning, and for another one with such a high valence
that makes him less likely to win because of his high unpredictability (variance). However, the
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equilibrium in open primaries resembles a median voter equilibrium since the winning candidate
would be one that maximizes the general median voter’s utility.
For this proof, I only look at the open primaries in party X to prove that qx = qy = 0 is the
only equilibrium. First, I show that for any qy > 0 all voters to the left of the general median
voter would rather vote for any candidate with q ≤ qy16 than for a candidate with no valence.
Then, I show that all voters to the right of the median voter (including him) would never vote for
a candidate with q ≥ qy. Lastly, I show that if there is a voter to the right of the general median
voter that prefers a candidate with q < qy, then that candidate wins the election. Thus, with a
similar reasoning, in Y primaries a candidate with valence smaller than q would win, and so in X’s
primaries they would like to vote for a candidate with an even smaller valence, and so on, until
qx = qy = 0, which I prove is an equilibrium.
Define the interim utility of voter i - EUi(qX , qY )- as the expected utility of the voter when X’s
candidate has a valence of qX , and Y candidate’s valence is qY . For instance, if EUi(q = 0, 0) >
EUi(q > 0, 0), then voter i votes for the candidate with no valence, and otherwise. Below is the
full proof, where I assumed that q ∈ [0, argmaxPx]
Lemma 12 For all voters with zi < 0, and for all q: V (q) < 4zix+ V (qy), then
EUi(q, qy) > EUi(0, qy)
Proof. Let P (q, qy)− P (0, qy) ≡ ∆P ≥ 0. The equation above implies
[4zix+ V (qy)][P (q, qy)− P (0, qy)] > V (q)P (q, qy)− V (0)P (0, qy)
⇔
[4zix+ V (qy)]∆P > V (q)∆P > V (q)P (q, qy)− V (0)P (0, qy)
⇔
4zix+ V (qy) > V (q)
⇔
q ≤ V −1(4zix+ V (qy))⇒ q ≤ qy
Therefore, the question is what do voters with zi ≥ 0 vote for? If they all prefer to choose a
zero-valence-candidate, then that candidate wins. On the other hand, they may prefer to vote for
the high valence candidate, as that increases the candidate’s variance as well. If they would rather
16Actually, the condition is less restrictive:
q ≤ V −1(4zix+ V (qy))
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choose the high valence candidate, then the high valence candidate wins.
Lemma 13 For all voters with zi ≥ 0, and for all q ≥ qy, then
EUi(q, qy) < EUi(0, qy)
Proof. As above, the equation in the lemma, implies
[4zix+ V (qy)]∆P < V (q)P (q, qy)− V (0)P (0, qy)
⇔
4zix+ V (qy) < V (q)
Which always holds under the conditions in the lemma.
Lemma 14 For all voters with zi ≥ 0, then q < qy is an equilibrium where
EUi(q, qy) ≥ EUi(0, qy)
only if qx = qy = 0.
When q < qy, the condition in (17) may hold for a large set of parameters. However, it cannot hold
in equilibrium for q 6= 0 as I prove below, by contradiction.
Proof. Suppose exists zj > 0 such that j votes for q < qy < q¯. Then, all voters in X primaries
with zi ≤ 0 and j vote for the candidate with qx = q. But then in Y primaries, exists j′, with
−zj′ > 0 such that he votes for q < qy < q¯. Then all voters in Y primaries with zi ≥ 0 and j′ vote
for candidate with qy = q. But then the cycle begins again, and allways a candidate with lower
valence would be selected until qx = qy = 0. It remains to be proved that the pair (0, 0) is an
equilibrium. Thus, I investigate under which conditions the best response of a voter with zi ≥ 0 is
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to vote for a candidate with zero valence when qy = 0.
EUi(0, 0) > EUi(q>0, 0)
⇔
Px(0, 0)(ui(x; 0, 0)− ui(y; 0, 0))− (zi − y)2 − V (0) > PX(q, 0)(ui(x; q, 0)− ui(y; q, 0))− (zi − y)2 − V (0)
⇔
0.5(ui(x; 0, 0)− ui(y; 0, 0)) > α+ ωq − V (q)
2α
(ui(x; q, 0)− ui(y; q, 0))
0.5(−(zi − x)2 + (zi − y)2) > α+ ωq − V (q)
2α
(2zi(x− y)− V (q))
⇔
4zix >
ωq − V (q)
α
(4zix− V (q)) + 4zix− V (q)
⇔
V (q) >
ωq − V (q)
α
(4zix− V (q)) (17)
Which always holds, since the LHS is positive, and the RHS is always negative for ωq − V (q) > 0
and zi > 0. Therefore, i’s best response in open primaries, when zi > 0 is:
BRi(qY = 0) = 0, ∀ zi > 0 in X’s open primaries
7.3 The nomination subgame with discrete valence
Studying the discrete case serves two purposes. First, it illustrates the main trade-off and results
in a transparent and plain setting. Second, assuming that valence can take only two values can
also be interpreted as if there are two candidates with different valence in each primary election.
This allows to fairly situate my results into the literature of primaries, where most of the models
assume two exogenous candidates with different valence and ideology (Meirowitz (2005), Hummel
(2010)).
Say that there are two valence levels qH > qL, and the probability of winning increases with
high valence candidates:
ωqH − V (qH) > ωqL − V (qL).
Let the platforms be symmetric, and the probability of X winning when the party chooses a low
valence candidate be Px(qL), as defined in the main body of the paper. Let Πi stand for the net
payoff of winning to voter i with ideology zi, and let Πl stand for the net payoff of winning to the
party leader, with ideology zx. The median voter in the primaries with ideology zi and ego rents
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Let the uncertainty α has to be large enough such that the probability of X winning is bounded
by 1, hence α ≥ ω(qH − qL) +VL−VH . Let x = −y < 0 be the parties’ platforms; and let Vy stand
for party Y’s choice, and V−y for the complement, i.e. if Y’s choice is VH , then V−y = VL.
Lemma 15 Let VH ≡ V (qH), and VL ≡ V (qL), then the two conditions above are satisfied if and
only if
Πi ≡ δi + 4xzi < (VH − VL)α
ω(qH − qL) + VL − VH + V−y − Vy < δ + 4zxx ≡ Πl. (18)
As explained in the main body of the paper, parties create a correlation between valence and
variance among their members. I am interested in the case when parties attract high valence
individuals far from their platform, then that correlation is positive; and, consequently, the ideology
of a high valence candidate is more uncertain than a low valence candidate.
However, before introducing this case, I briefly digress to study what would happen in the other
one: if the return to valence B(q) is decreasing in valence, then the correlation is negative. In
that case, voters expect that high-valence candidates are also closer to the party platform (more
certainty). Then, there is no trade off, and when voters are risk averse the parties always choose
the highest valence candidate. In the toy model above, when the variance is decreasing in valence,
VH < VL, the middle term in equation (18) is always negative, and so the left hand of the equation
does not hold. So under any nomination rule, the chosen candidates are high-valence.
On the other hand, when the variance increases with valence, VH > VL, a trade-off between
valence and variance arises. Then, parties do not always nominate the highest valence party member
because voters learn that his preferred policy is more uncertain. In the model, notice that as the
cost of higher valence (VH − VL) increases, the middle term in (18) increases, and so the scope
for nominating higher valence candidates is reduced. On the other hand, as the uncertainty (α)
decreases, the “randomness” of the electoral process diminishes and so it makes sense for parties to
invest in higher valence members. In the equation above, the left part becomes binding for a low
enough value of α.
It is also interesting that valence would decrease monotonically (in the continuous case) with
the ideology of the “nominator”. In this simple setup, as you increase zi < 0, the left hand side
becomes smaller, and so the scope for choosing higher valence candidates is reduced. Intuitively,
as the parties are less differentiated, the gain in utility through policy when your party wins is
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reduced because the two parties have more similar policies. Therefore, the returns to investing in
high valence are lower.
Thus, the more centrist the parties are (and nominators), the more likely the candidate is low
valence. This intuition also drives the main result: since, in equilibrium party leaders are always
more extreme than the party mean17, they always choose more popular candidates than primaries.
That is, for standard values of VH − VL, the lemma is satisfied for |zx| > |zi|.
Then, I sum up the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (The discrete nomination subgame) .
1. Party leaders choose more popular candidates than closed primaries(i.e. more centrist nomi-
nators are more likely to select a low valence candidate)
2. Less ideological differentiation between parties leads to lower valence candidates (i.e. valence
and platforms are substitutes)
3. Larger ego rents (δ), and/or less uncertainty (α) lead to higher valence candidates
4. As the returns to valence increase (ω), and its cost decrease (VH−VL), parties are more likely
to chose higher valence candidates18.
All the facts above still hold in the more general continuous case, which allows for richer conclusions.
7.4 Probabilistic voting
There is a continuum of voters whose utility depend on the implemented policy and their affiliation
decisions. Let the pair of the unobserved ideology, and observed valence -(z˜i, qi)- identify each
voter, with zi ∼ U [−k, k], qi ∼ U [0, q¯], and zi⊥qi. To keep it short, let ui(·, X) be the utility if
party X’s candidate wins, for all affiliation decisions. All voters have an exogenous preference for
party Y over X, which can be decomposed in an individual preference βi ∼ U [−β, β], and a general
bias
α˜ ∼ U [−α+ h(qY − qX), α+ h(qY − qX)],
which could be described as idiosyncratic and national shocks, unobserved by the parties; the
national shock’s distribution depends on the valence -campaigning skills- of the candidates. Also
notice that in the main body of the paper I do not introduce the idiosyncratic shock: I do it here
to highlight that, under this setup, it does not affect the probability of winning.
17I show this when I solve the party formation game
18The derivative of the middle term with respect to VH − VL is
αω(qH − qL)
ω(qH − qL)− (VH − VL) ± 1
which is always positive.
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Thus, a voter i votes for party X if:
ui(·, X)− ui(·, Y ) > βi + α˜,
hence
Pr(ui(·, X)− ui(·, Y ) ≥ βi + α˜) = Pr(ui(·, X)− ui(·, Y )− α˜ ≥ βi)
=
ui(·, X)− ui(·, Y )− α˜+ β
2β
=





≡ P i(ui(·, X), ui(·, Y ); α˜) ≡ P i (19)
Notice that parties are all of the same size since they have the same recruiting technology, and
the uniform distribution of ideologies. Thus, integrating over the affiliated and non-affiliated voters
does not change any of the following results. Hence, given the realization of the national shock, the

























The results stated in Proposition (1) come from solving the maximization problems at the nomina-
tion and party formation stages. I proceed to solve each problem here. Regarding the nomination
stage.





p)) = Pxun(ap, z˜X ; q
r
x) + (1− Px)un(ap, z˜Y ; qry).
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Then, remember that for any nomination rule r, I define Πr ≡ un(·; qX)− un(·; qY ), and
0 =P ′x(un(·; qX)− un(·; qY )) + u′n(·; qX)Px + u′n(·; qY )(1− Px)
0 =
ω − V ′(qX)
2α




And the SOC hold strictly: −V ′′(qX)(Πr2α + PX) < 0. Thus, when x = −y:




there is a unique symmetric equilibrium, shown in equations (9), (11), and (13).
Optimal platforms
Regarding the party formation stage.
Proof. Second, during the party formation stage, the party leader chooses the platform such as he































Hence, in the symmetric equilibrium, the equation (21) becomes:





Before moving to the proof of the Proposition itself, I prove lemma (10) and the following
remark, by which party leaders find optimal to form a party for large enough k.
Why do leaders form parties? Here I prove that a political entrepreneur (zx, q¯) with the
maximum possible valence forms a party when he faces (zy, qi). Then it follows that party leaders
with lower valence will form parties as well. Recall that if we would let a non affiliated citizen to be
a candidate, the voters’ beliefs on their policy preference and uncertainty would be: E(zp) = 0, and
V (zp) = σ =
k2
3 . Notice that this proof holds for any pair (zx, zy), and not only for the symmetric
case.
Proof. Let Px(ex|ey) be the probability that X wins, given that zy has chosen ey ∈ {0, Y },
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where 0 means that he is running alone, while ey = Y means that he formed a party. With this
notation, the sketch of the proof is straightforward: I want to show that the best response of X to
Y’s strategy is to form a party. So, if
P (X|Y )Π(X|Y ) > P (0|Y )Π(0|Y ),
and
P (X|0)Π(X|0) > P (0|0)Π(0|0),
then forming the party is a dominant strategy for both entrepreneurs, due to symmetry. Then it
follows that
δ + (Vy − Vx) + (y − zx)2 − (x− zx)2
δ + Vy + (y − zx)2 > 1 +





−x2 − Vy + σ2 − (q¯ − qx)
α
>
δ + (zy − zx)2
δ − Vx + (zy − zx)2 − (x− zx)2 .
And there exists finite σ such that they hold.
7.5.1 Proposition (1)
The monotonicity result in the proposition is straightforward from equations (9), (11), (13):
Proof. Since V ′(qr) ≥ 0 for all r, then if V ′(q) > V ′(q′), then q > q′. Then, the last inequality










while the first inequality follows from zx <
4(xc)2−δ
4xl
. Thus for any given platform xl = xc = x, the
inequality always holds since zx < x in equilibrium.













= xr − zx.
Then, the extremism results are proved.
Proof. First, suppose that xo ≥ xr for r ∈ {c, l}. Then,













which is absurd. Then, xo < xr.
With the same reasoning as above, let B(qi) = aq
2
i +b, I prove that for α > Πr(x
l, then xl > xc.

















which is absurd because when 0 > xc ≥ xl, then Πl ≥ Πc, and both sides of the inequality are








7.5.2 Welfare analysis: proof of lemma (3)
Proof. First, subtract equation (14) from (10). Then







Ωo ≡ u0(xo, 0) = −(xo)2 ≤ −(xl)2 − Vx(ql) = u0(xl, ql) ≡ Ωl
⇔
(xl)2 − (xo)2 ≤ −Vx(ql)
⇔













Third, let B(qi) = aq
2
i + b, and assume symmetry. Then I can calculate Vx(q



























which implies α > Πl(x
l), when 0.5 ≤ Πl(xl) ≤ 1. And notice that the LHS is positive and smaller
than:
−xo(α+ δ) 1−4zx .
Therefore, given xo, b, and δ. Assume large α as above, then the RHS is increasing in ωa . Thus,
exists m¯ ≡ m(α, δ, b;xo):
LHS ≤ −xo(α+ δ) 1−4zx ≤ RHS(m¯).
7.5.3 Comparative statics
Let B(qi) = aq
2






















First, I show the proof of (4). Proof.
• Let the parties be extreme: maxr Πr > 2α > 0.5α. Then, since ∂q∂α < 0, and ∂q∂x < 0, when
∂x
∂α > 0, the total effect
dq
dα is unambiguous. Therefore, I look under which conditions this is
the case, using the implicit function theorem. Let R(x, ωα) ≡ −∂FOC∂x > 0. Then, in equation











which is positive if ∂
2V (qr)
∂x∂α is negative and large. Let
ω


















]} < 0 (23)




















• Let the parties be moderate: minr Πr < 0.5α < 2α. Then, ∂xr∂α < 0, and the total effect is
ambiguous.
Second, I show the proof of lemma (7.5.3). The proof of lemma (7.5.3), as mentioned below,
resembles the one above closely. lemma(4)
Proof. Here, I prove the lemmas (7.5.3), and (7.5.3).
• Ego rents, r = c. Notice that in the equation below, αR(·) = Πc + 4xzx + α + ∂2V∂x2 , where
∂2V
∂x2











Where R(x, ωα) = −∂FOC∂x , which is increasing in ωα , and decreasing in x, is always smaller
than Πc.
• Ego rents, r = l. This proof follows step by step the proof of lemma (4).
7.6 Extensions
7.6.1 Partisan screening: Lemma (7), and x(s)
Proof. Let B˜(q) ≡ B(q)s , then V˜ (q) ≡ V (q)s , and so the optimal valence can be written as
V˜ ′(q) = ω
δ + 4nrxx
α









and it follows that qrP (s) increases with the screening costs.
The proof of x(s) < 0 increasing monotonically in s follows from equation (7).










7.6.2 Observed ideologies: lemma (8)
To show that the monotonicity result in proposition (1) also holds if the ideologies are observed
instead of valence, it is enough to show that: ∂cx∂nx < 0. First, I show how does the affiliation
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decisions change as I change the previous assumption; second, I show that the result still holds.
If a voter (z˜i, qi) affiliates to party P, then B(qi) > (zi−xp)2. Let cp be the observed candidates’





Assume B(qi) = aq
2
i + b, and let nx be the nominator’s ideology from party X with ideology, in a
symmetric game; then he maximizes
α+ c2y − c2x + ω[E(qy|cy)− E(qx|cx)]
2α
(δn + 4cxnx)
The lemma (8) states that for large enough α there exists a large ω/a such that the equilibrium
cx is decreasing in nx. Thus, the main result of monotonicity holds: more moderate nominators
choose lower valence candidates. Using the implicit function theorem, and for a large enough α,










Proof. For cx > x, in the F.O.C. the ideology of the candidate is implicitly defined by




)− 2(cX − nx)Px = 0.

















(·)1/2 − 2cx) + 1 < 0,
and since 0 > cx > x, the inequality above holds for large enough
ω
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